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Abstract This article analyzes the decisions involving
State aid granted to professional football clubs in
financial difficulty, namely Willem II, MVV Maastricht,
NEC Nijmegen, FC Den Bosch and Valencia CF. The
decisions are fundamentally different in one very
important aspect: the aid granted to the Dutch clubs was
declared compatible aid, whereas the aid granted to
Valencia CF was declared incompatible and needs to be
recovered. This article will explain why there were
divergences in the decisions and will describe the
broader lessons that are to be learned, particularly in
order to avoid future recovery decisions.
Keywords State aid  EU competition law  Rescuing and
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1 Introduction
Professional football as a global business continues to
grow at a steady pace. To give but a few examples, more
than 1.013 billion people worldwide watched the World
Cup final between Germany and Argentina in 2014, 100
million more than the final of 2010,1 while FIFA’s
television broadcasting rights revenue worldwide for that
year was over €650 million.2 The record fee paid for an
individual transfer has once again been broken in 2016,3
and with more money generated than ever from the
selling of TV-rights,4 and the emergence of China as an
economic power on the football scene,5 it is likely that
transfer fees as well as player wages will go up in the
years to come.
Notwithstanding the constant commercialization of
professional football, there were also large concerns
regarding the increasing indebtedness of football clubs.6
Some historically successful clubs like Glasgow Rangers
and FC Parma were declared bankrupt in 2012 and 2015,
respectively, forcing them to change their corporate iden-
tity and re-enter professional football at the lowest level of
competition. As is shown in UEFA’s yearly benchmarking
reports, the deficit of clubs with a UEFA License increased
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1 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil – Television Audience Report, page
7.
2 Statista, Television broadcasting rights revenue of the FIFA
worldwide by region from 2009 to 2015. https://www.statista.com/
statistics/268839/fifa-broadcasting-rights-revenue-worldwide-by-region/
. Accessed 5 January 2017.
3 French player Paul Pogba was transferred for a record fee of €105
million from Juventus to Manchester United in August 2016.
4 The English Premier League in particular stands out, having sold its
domestic TV-rights for roughly €6 billion for three seasons from 2016
to 2017.
5 In recent weeks alone, Argentinian player Carlos Te´vez signed a
deal with Chinese club Shanghai Shenhua that will earn him close to
€40 million a year, while Brazilian player Oscar will receive €25
million a year from his new club Shanghai SIPG.
6 UEFA Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year ending
2011, page 3. See also Serby (2016), page 43.
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from €0.6 billion in 2007 to a peak of €1.7 billion in 2011.7
The increasing indebtedness was not only related to the
global economic crisis,8 but also caused by irresponsible
spending by the clubs.9
With the objective of, inter alia, protecting the long-
term viability and sustainability of European club foot-
ball, UEFA introduced a break-even requirement for the
clubs that have qualified for a UEFA club competition
from the 2013-2014 season onwards. According to this
requirement, clubs must demonstrate that their expendi-
ture does not exceed their revenue should they wish to
avoid sanctions by UEFA Club Financial Control
Body.10 In a joint statement with UEFA from March
2012, the European Commission also recognized the
increasing indebtedness of football clubs and pointed out
that ‘‘there is a significant risk that football clubs will
increasingly apply for financial help to the (…) public
authorities in order to be able to continue playing pro-
fessional football’’.11
The joint-statement led Craven to believe that State
aid enforcement in professional football became a
Commission priority and that many investigations would
be launched.12 By the end of 2013, this indeed appeared
to be the case, with the Commission opening formal
investigations regarding alleged State aid granted to
seven Spanish professional football clubs13 and five
Dutch professional football clubs.14 Furthermore, as
became apparent from the opening decisions, all five
Dutch clubs as well as the Spanish clubs Valencia CF,
Elche CF and He´rcules CF were in financial difficulty at
the time the State aid was granted.15 The Commission’s
final decisions, announced on 4 July 201616 and pub-
lished a few months afterward, will form the empirical
backbone of this article.
In recent years, UEFA released better overall results
regarding the indebtedness of professional football
clubs.17 Yet, there are still many clubs across Europe
that are struggling financially. As a consequence, future
State aid measures by (local) public authorities to pro-
fessional football clubs in financial difficulty can be
expected. For instance, on 16 February 2017, the
Enschede city Council agreed to guarantee a loan of €8.4
million granted to the Dutch club FC Twente, which
aims to, inter alia, preserve an earlier loan granted by
the municipality to the club of €17 million.18 Even
though FC Twente has still not received this loan at the
time of writing, the commercial and technical director of
the club has stated that the guarantee is ‘‘crucial for the
survival of FC Twente’’.19 Keeping in mind that a
Commission investigation into this guarantee is now a
realistic possibility, it is important for both public
authorities and clubs to understand under what criteria
State aid to clubs in financial difficulty is permitted.
This article will therefore closely analyze the decisions
involving State aid granted to professional football clubs in
financial difficulty.20 These are the Dutch clubs Willem
7 UEFA Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year ending
2011, page 13.
8 Van Maren (2015), pages 86–87. As will also be explained in
Sect. 2.2, the case of Valencia CF is a particularly good example of
how the global economic and housing crisis affected professional
football.
9 UEFA Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year ending
2009, page 9. See also Craven (2014a), page 584.
10 UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations,
Edition 2012, Articles 58–63. Article 61 allows for an acceptable de-
viation of €5 million, i.e. the maximum aggregate break-even deficit
possible for a club to be deemed in compliance with the break-even
requirement.
11 Joint Statement of 21 March 2012 by Vice-President Joaquı´n
Almunia and President Michel Platini, point 12.
12 Craven (2014b), page 206.
13 Commission Press Release of 18 December 2013, IP/13/1287 State
aid: Commission opens in-depth investigation into public funding of
certain Spanish professional football clubs.
14 Commission Press Release of 6 March 2013, IP/13/192, State aid:
Commission opens in-depth investigation into public funding of five
Dutch professional football clubs.
15 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 18 December 2013 – Spain:
Alleged aid in favour of three Valencia football clubs; and
Commission Decision SA.33584 of 6 March 2013 – The Netherlands
Alleged municipal aid to the Professional Dutch football clubs
Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in
2008-2011.
16 Commission Press Release of 4 July 2016, IP/16/2401 State aid:
Commission decides Spanish professional football clubs have to pay
back incompatible aid; and Commission Press Release of 4 July 2016,
IP/16/2402 State aid: Commission clears support measures for certain
football clubs in the Netherlands.
17 Benchmarking report on the clubs qualified and licensed to
compete in the UEFA competition season 2013/14, page 7.
18 Garantstelling gemeente t.b.v. geldlening(en) aan FC Twente
Stadion BV, version of 12 January 2016. http://www.raad053.nl/
stukken/8755/1/. Accessed 21 February 2017. For more information
on the financial situation of FC Twente, see, for example, O. van
Maren, The Rise and Fall of FC Twente. Asser International Sports
Law Blog, 19 May 2016. http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/
the-rise-and-fall-of-fc-twente. Accessed 5 January 2017.
19 Mijn 2017: Van Halst en de wederopbouw van FC Twente. NOS, 5
January 2017. http://nos.nl/artikel/2151528-mijn-2017-van-halst-en-
de-wederopbouw-van-fc-twente.html. Accessed 5 January 2017.
20 Please note that to this day Valencia CF continues to maintain that
it was not in financial difficulty at the moment it received the State
aid.
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II,21 MVV Maastricht,22 NEC Nijmegen23 and FC Den
Bosch,24 and the Spanish clubs Valencia CF, He´rcules CF
and Elche CF.25 The decisions are fundamentally different
in one very important aspect: the aid granted to the Dutch
clubs was declared compatible under Article
107(3)(c) TFEU, whereas the aid granted to the three
Spanish clubs was declared incompatible and needs to be
recovered. Why were there divergences in the Commis-
sion’s decisions? As will be argued in this article, the devil
is very much in the details. In order to really grasp what
these details are, this article will only focus on one Spanish
club: Valencia CF. Such a focus allows for a clearer
description of the facts involving this (past) Spanish foot-
ball giant, as well as a more thorough scrutiny of the
Commission’s assessment. The last part of this article will
highlight the broader lessons that are to be learned by
football clubs and how future recovery decisions can be
avoided.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 will pro-
vide background information on all the clubs and the
respective State aid measures, while Sect. 3 will also
analyze why the Commission concluded that each measure
is to be considered State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU.
This will be followed by an overview on the compatibility
assessment, and in particular the so-called Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines, used for undertakings in finan-
cial difficulty.
Subsequently, in Sect. 5, the compatibility assessment
conducted by the Commission in its decisions will be
analyzed. At this point, it is important to highlight that the
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, used for the com-
patibility assessment, are regularly updated, the latest
version being published in 2014.26 However, because the
aid measures analyzed and discussed in this article were
granted in 2009 and 2010, the measures are scrutinized
under the older 2004 Rescue and Restructuring
Guidelines.27
Finally in Sect. 6, the conditions set out by the Com-
mission on the basis of the decisions will be discussed. In
this regard, it is worth referring to point 13 of the 2012 Joint
Statement, which held that when assessing the compatibility
of aid to undertakings facing financial difficulties ‘‘one of
the key factors that the Commission takes into account is
whether and how the undertaking in question implements
compensatory measures in the interest of fair competition.
Given the specificity of the sports sector, it is not always
straightforward to envisage such type of potential compen-
satory measures for football clubs.’’28 This section will
therefore determine whether the applied conditions and
criteria fit the professional football sector, and will briefly
discuss the changes made in the 2014 Rescue and Restruc-
turing Guidelines. This in turn allows us to determine
whether the decisions can serve as a blueprint for public
authorities within the EU willing to grant State aid to foot-
ball clubs in financial difficulty in the future.
2 Background of the investigated State aid
measures
This section briefly maps all the aid measures conferred by
the Dutch and Spanish public authorities, respectively. It
explains why the Commission had doubts regarding the
legality of the measures under EU State aid rules and why
it launched the formal investigation procedures.
2.1 The measures in favour of the four Dutch
professional football clubs
2.1.1 Willem II
In 2004, the municipality of Tilburg and football clubWillem
II concludeda contract, bywhichTilburgbecame theowner of
Willem II’s stadiumand the clubobtained a lease for the use of
the stadium.29 The annual rent of the stadium was established
at €1 million, based on a depreciation period of 30 years,
investment costs and an interest rate of 5.5%.30
21 Commission Decision SA.40168 of 4 July 2016 on State Aid
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club Willem II in Tilburg.
22 Commission Decision SA.41612 of 4 July 2016 on State Aid
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club MVV in Maastricht.
23 Commission Decision SA.41617 of 4 July 2016 on State Aid
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club NEC in Nijmegen.
24 Commission Decision SA.41614 of 4 July 2016 on State Aid
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club FC Den Bosch in ‘s-Hertogenbosch.
25 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016 on the State Aid
for Valencia Club de Fu´tbol Sociedad Ano´nima Deportiva, He´rcules
Club de Fu´tbol Sociedad Ano´nima Deportiva and Elche Club de
Fu´tbol Sociedad Ano´nima Deportiva.
26 Communication from the Commission of 31 July 2014 (2014/C
249/01)) Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-
financial undertakings in difficulty.
27 Communication from the Commission of 1 October 2004 (2004/C
244/02) Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and
Restructuring firms in difficulty.
28 Joint Statement of 21 March 2012 by Vice-President Joaquı´n
Almunia and President Michel Platini, point 13.
29 Commission Decision on State Aid SA.40168 of 4 July 2016
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club Willem II in Tilburg, para. 10.
30 Commission Decision SA.33584 of 6 March 2013 – The Nether-
lands Alleged municipal aid to the Professional Dutch football clubs
Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in
2008-2011, para. 29.
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In May 2010, Willem II found itself on the verge of
bankruptcy. The municipality was quick to realize the
potential negative effects a bankruptcy could have for
Tilburg. These negative effects consisted of (1) the loss of
rental income; (2) the absence of a tenant for the stadium;
(3) the absence of professional football in Tilburg; and (4)
the necessity to demolish the stadium and all the costs it
would entail.31 As a result, on 31 May 2010 the munici-
pality decided to lower the rent to €905,000 per year and to
decrease the variable costs. Both measures were taken with
retroactive effect till 1 July 2004, which resulted in Willem
II receiving a total of €2.4 million from the municipality.32
Tilburg’s rescue operation of Willem II was never
notified to the Commission.33 Instead, a citizen informed
DG Competition shortly after the measure was imple-
mented by means of a letter. This prompted the Commis-
sion to send a request for information to the Netherlands on
14 March 2011.34
In response to the Commission, the Dutch authorities
argued that the new rent agreement was in conformity with
the current municipal calculation methods and that the
basic principles of the 2004 agreement were still respected.
Moreover, the costs Tilburg would suffer for letting
Willem II go bankrupt would be higher than the rescue
costs. Consequently, the municipality believed it acted in
accordance with the so-called ‘Market Economy Investor
Principle’ (MEIP).35 Besides, the municipality imposed a
restructuring plan that aimed at restoring the club’s long-
term viability. The conditions of this plan included finding
a way to clean up its balance sheet and the need to respect
the national football association’s regulations on wages of
players.36 As will be shown later on in the article, and
specifically in Sect. 5.1, successfully imposing a restruc-
turing plan aimed at restoring long-term viability proved
fundamental in order to get the aid measure to be ‘allowed’
by the Commission.
In its decision to open a formal investigation, the
Commission counter argued that the depreciation of the
stadium’s rent was already adjusted in 2007, and would not
justify the retroactive application until 2004. Additionally,
the lowering of the variable costs with retroactive effects
ended up lower than the actual maintenance costs for that
period, and should therefore be considered as State aid in
accordance with Article 107(1) TFEU.37 Finally, at the
time the Commission launched the formal investigation, it
nourished doubts whether the aid measure could be con-
sidered compatible with the internal market pursuant
Article 107(3)(c). Having received no notification of the
rescue measure, the Commission was unable to carry out a
proper compatibility assessment.
2.1.2 MVV
In 2010, football club MVV was facing severe financial
difficulties: its total debt amounted to €6.5 million,
including €1.7 million to the municipality of Maastricht.
As a means of aiding its local football club, the munici-
pality decided to waive its claim of €1.7 million and bought
the stadium for €1.85 million.38 The municipality held that
the purchase was done in accordance with the MEIP and
that the stadium would be used for multifunctional pur-
poses. The parties agreed that MVV would use the €1.85
million to finance preferential claims, such as taxes and
pensions.39
The Commission opened a formal investigation proce-
dure, because it was unable to conclude on the basis of the
available information (the rescue measures were not noti-
fied40) that the behaviour of the municipality had been that
of a typical creditor in a market economy.41 Firstly, it
doubted whether a total remission of the claim (€1.7 mil-
lion) was necessary, since other creditors transformed their
claim into a claim on future income from transfer payments
or ‘‘only’’ waived 50% of their claim. Secondly, according
to the Commission, the purchase price of the stadium was
estimated on the basis of replacement value rather than the
real market value. It further raised doubts as to whether the
municipality acted in accordance with the MEIP since
investing in a football stadium depending on one captive
user entails a very high risk, even when claiming that you
want to make it multifunctional.42 No compatibility
assessment of the aid measure in favour of MVV was
carried out, because the measure was not notified.43
31 Ibid, para. 30.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid, para. 67.
34 Ibid, paras. 3–4. For more on how a citizen’s letter can instigate a
preliminary State aid investigation, see Van Rompuy and Van Maren
(2016).
35 The essence of this principle is that when a public authority invests
in an enterprise on terms and in conditions that would be acceptable to
a private investor operating under normal market economy condi-
tions, the investment is not State aid. See Slocock (2002).
36 SA.40168, para. 12.
37 SA.33584, paras. 29-31 and 51–53.
38 Ibid, para. 32.
39 Ibid, para. 57.
40 Ibid, para. 67.
41 Commission Decision on State Aid SA.41612 of 4 July 2016
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club MVV in Maastricht, para. 12.
42 SA.33584, paras. 54–57.
43 SA.41612, para. 11.
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2.1.3 FC Den Bosch
In 2010 it became apparent that without financial aid FC
Den Bosch would have been declared bankrupt. Due to a
constant decrease of turnover, the prospect of repaying its
debts to, inter alia, the municipality of Den Bosch (to
which it owed €1.65 million) were diminishing by the
day.44
The subsequent rescue operation consisted in trans-
forming the legal structure of the club from association to
limited company. The municipality, as well as the other
creditors agreed to swap their loans into shares of the club.
The municipality obtained 54.4% of the shares of the new
limited company, whereas the remaining shares were held
by other large creditors who also swapped equity for their
claims.45 The municipality’s shares were then sold for €1
(one euro) to a foundation set up by the supporters’ group
of the football club.46 In addition to the debt waiver, Den
Bosch bought the club’s training and youth block for €1.4
million, under the condition that the football club would
leave the premises.47
In its decision to launch a formal State aid investigation,
he Commission found that there was an economic advan-
tage for FC Den Bosch. Importantly, the municipality did
not behave according to the market economy creditor
principle, since other creditors transformed their claim into
shareholding instead of selling their claim for nought.
Furthermore, the municipality paid €1.4 million for a
training and youth block that was registered at €1 million in
the club’s accounts.48
According to the Dutch authorities, the measures did not
constitute State aid. In their view, there was no economic
advantage for the club, because the municipality did
behave in accordance with the market economy creditor
principle by waiving its claim. If FC Den Bosch had not
been able to redress its financial situation in June 2011, it
would have lost its licence to play professional football
according to the rules of the KNVB.49 Given that the
municipality is the owner of the stadium used by FC Den
Bosch,50 it is in the interest of the municipality not to have
the club lose its license since, as a consequence, the
municipality would lose its principle user and tenant.51
Moreover, the acquiring of the training facilities was done
at market price on the basis of an independent expertise.52
Prior to the launching of the formal investigation, however,
the Dutch authorities did not argue why the measure could
be compatible with the internal market.53
2.1.4 NEC Nijmegen
The Eendracht is a multifunctional sport complex owned
by the municipality of Nijmegen that includes a football
stadium, the Goffert. NEC Nijmegen, or simply ‘‘NEC’’, is
the main user of this stadium. A contract between NEC and
the municipality of 2003 included a ‘‘purchase option’’ for
NEC to acquire the Eendracht from Nijmegen.54
In 2008, NEC announced that it was willing to drop the
purchase option in exchange for €2.3 million, a price cal-
culated on the basis of external expertise.55 Although the
2003 contract did not stipulate a price for the complex, the
municipality did conclude that NEC held a right to claim
the purchase. After negotiation, the municipality agreed to
buy the option for €2.2 million from NEC in September
2010.56
In its decision to launch a formal State aid investigation,
the Commission expressed doubts whether the option was
sold under ‘‘normal’’ market conditions. Moreover, it
remained unclear whether NEC had a true right to this
option.57 The Commission further highlighted the fact that
NEC was facing financial difficulties that were ‘‘serious
enough to endanger its future as a professional football
club’’ in the years 2008–2010.58 However, contrary to the
other ‘‘Dutch’’ State aid cases, the Dutch authorities argued
that NEC was not a firm in difficulty. Claiming that a firm
is not in financial difficulty is interesting for several rea-
sons, as will become apparent from the Valencia case as
well. For the NEC case specifically, this claim is important
since, as will be explained in Sect. 3, the burden of proof to
demonstrate that the conditions of the so-called Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines, including demonstrating that the
firm concerned is actually financial difficulty, lies with the
Member State and not with the Commission.
44 Commission Decision on State Aid SA.41614 of 4 July 2016
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club FC Den Bosch in ‘s-Hertogenbosch, para. 8.
45 Ibid, paras. 24-25.
46 Ibid, para. 9.
47 Ibid, paras. 10-11.
48 Commission Decision SA.33584 of 6 March 2013 – The Nether-
lands Alleged municipal aid to the Professional Dutch football clubs
Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in
2008-2011, paras. 35-37 and 63-66.
49 SA.41614, para. 18.
50 Ibid, para. 7.
51 Ibid, para. 30.
52 Ibid, para. 19.
53 Ibid, paras. 15–16.
54 Commission Decision on State Aid SA.41617 of 4 July 2016
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club NEC in Nijmegen, paras. 8–9.
55 Ibid, para. 10.
56 Ibid. paras. 10-11.
57 SA.33584, paras. 24–28 and 45–50.
58 Ibid, para. 49.
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2.2 The measures in favour of Valencia CF
Valencia CF, it is worth remembering, was one of Europe’s
finest football clubs at the turn of the millennium. It
reached back to back Champions League finals in 2000 and
2001, won the Spanish Liga in 2002 and 2004 and was
ranked 18th in February 2008 by Deloitte in its ranking of
football clubs by revenue generated.59 To fit the club’s
elevated status and future ambitions, plans were presented
for a new ‘Mestalla’ stadium in 2006, with constructions
commencing in 2007.60 The new stadium would be the
property of the football club, and would be financed
through bank loans, as well as through the (hypothetical)
sale of the old ‘Mestalla’ stadium. In the years 2006–2007
it was believed that the sale of the of old stadium would
generate at least €350 million.61
However, Valencia CF suffered losses of €26.1 million
and €59.2 million in the financial years ending in June
2007 and June 2009, respectively, while its annual turnover
decreased from €107.6 million in 2007 to €99.4 million in
2008 down to €82.4 million in 2009.62 Moreover, the
global financial crisis of 2008, and the Spanish property
bubble in particular, had severe direct consequences for
Valencia CF. Not only was the club incapable of finding
buyers for the old stadium, but the expected sale price
dropped to €250 million in 2009. In addition to that,
financial data from the period 2004–2009 showed that the
club was making constant losses on the transfer market.63
In 2009, Valencia CF, aiming to continue the con-
struction works on the new stadium, decided to sell new
shares for a total capital injection of €92.4 million.
Unfortunately, club shareholders only subscribed €18.8
million in shares. The remaining shares were therefore
acquired by La Fundacio´n del Valencia Club de Fu´tbol (a
foundation especially created by the club for this purpose)
becoming majority shareholder of the club (70.6%) for the
sum of €75 million. This money was loaned by the bank
BANCAJA (now Bankia), and guaranteed for 100% by the
Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas (IVF), a public financing
institution under the control of the government of the
autonomous region of Valencia, on 5 November 2009. The
entire loan needed to be repaid by August 2015, with
annual repayments of interest starting in August 2010. In
order to repay the interest and the loan’s capital, La Fun-
dacio´n would sell the shares acquired to third parties.
Furthermore, the IVF would receive an annual guarantee
premium of 0.5% and a one-off 1% commitment fee, to be
paid by La Fundacio´n.64
The State guarantee also included the so-called ‘2009
viability plan of Valencia CF, imposing specific mea-
sures to help the club regain its financial viability. In
addition to the capital increase of €92.4 million, these
measures comprised making the new stadium operational
as soon as possible, thereby increasing income through
ticket sales and revenue generated through shops, ser-
vices, etc.; selling the old stadium (once again), as well
as the club’s training grounds; reduce expenditure
regarding the football squad (selling players, reducing
salaries, etc.); and selling shares of so-called players’
economic rights.65
In 2010, La Fundacio´n defaulted on its interest payment
of €6 million to the bank. Consequently, a new loan of €6
million was provided by Bankia, which was once again
guaranteed for 100% by IVF. The deadline for the repay-
ment of the entire loan remained August 2015.66
Having received information by citizens and through
press reports regarding potential unlawful State aid, the
European Commission officially asked Spain to com-
ment on these reports on 8 April 2013.67 Notwithstand-
ing Spain’s claim that there was no State aid, the
Commission decided to initiate a formal investigation
procedure on 18 December 2013.68 The Commission
doubted whether the guarantees provided by IVF were
aligned with the so-called ‘‘2008 Guarantee Notice’’,69
and doubted whether the criteria of the Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines were fulfilled, particularly
since the Spanish authorities did not provide any possi-
ble grounds for compatibility.70
To add to the complexity of the case, in October 2014
(i.e. during the formal investigation period) La Fundacio´n
succeeded in selling its shares to Meriton Holdings Limited
for €100 million. This allowed La Fundacio´n to repay the
59 Deloitte, ‘Football Money League’, February 2008. https://www2.
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Audit/gx-deloi-
tte-football-money-league-2008.pdf. Accessed 2 December 2016.
60 Design & Build Network, ‘Nou Mestalla Stadium, Valencia,
Spain’. http://www.designbuild-network.com/projects/nou-mestalla/.
Accessed 2 December 2016.
61 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016 on the State Aid
for Valencia Club de Fu´tbol Sociedad Ano´nima Deportiva, He´rcules
Club de Fu´tbol Sociedad Ano´nima Deportiva and Elche Club de
Fu´tbol Sociedad Ano´nima Deportiva, para. 23.
62 Ibid, paras. 15 and 75.
63 Ibid, para. 23.
64 Ibid, paras. 6-8.
65 Ibid, para. 23. It is worth highlighting that with the last measure, in
essence, the Spanish public authorities endorsed, or even encouraged,
Valencia CF to engage in Third Party Ownership (TPO).
66 Ibid, para. 12.
67 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 18 December 2013 – Spain:
Alleged aid in favour of three Valencia football clubs, para. 3.
68 Ibid.
69 Commission Notice of 20 June 2008 (2008/C 155/02) on the
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the
form of guarantees.
70 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, paras. 29-35.
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two loans provided by Bankia which were guaranteed by
the IVF.71
3 The measures constitute State aid in accordance
with article 107(1) TFEU
Article 107(1) TFEU formulates the general prohibition of
granting State aid.72 In order for a measure to constitute
State aid, it has to grant a selective economic advantage to
one or more undertakings, through State resources, distort
or threaten to distort competition and affect trade. The
European Commission considered all the measures ana-
lyzed in this article to constitute State aid within the scope
of Article 107(1) TFEU. This section will explain why the
Commission reached this conclusion.
3.1 The Dutch football clubs
3.1.1 Willem II
Lowering stadium rent with retroactive affect had a direct
consequence on the budget of Tilburg, thus involving a
transfer of State resources to Willem II. Moreover, as a
professional football club, Willem II is an undertaking
active in (European) football competitions73 and other
cross-border markets, such as the transfer market, mer-
chandising and media coverage. Any State aid granted to
Willem II could therefore distort competition and affect
trade.74
As to the question whether Willem II obtained a selec-
tive economic advantage by means of the aid measure, the
Commission disagrees with the Netherlands’ claim that the
municipality behaved in accordance with the MEIP.
Importantly, Tilburg was not making any profit from the
rent and exploitation of the stadium under the original 2004
agreement. No ‘normal’ market economy investor would
subsequently reduce that rent and decrease variable costs
with the knowledge that there is no perspective whatsoever
that there will be a return on the investment.75
3.1.2 MVV
By way of reminder, the Commission had to assess whether
a decision by Maastricht to waive a claim Maastricht of
€1.7 million, and the purchase of the stadium and training
facilities for €1.85 million using State resources constituted
a selective advantage to MVV. The Commission believed
that a ‘normal’ market economy investor, or operator,
would not have taken these measures. Even though the
municipality was not the only creditor of MVV, several
private creditors transformed the debt into a future transfer
payments paid to MVV for players leaving the club, instead
of simply waiving the claim like Maastricht did.76 As
regards the purchase of the stadium and training grounds,
the Commission disagrees with the Dutch public authori-
ties that it took place under market conditions. The
Netherlands had argued that ‘‘the municipality’s reasons
for buying the stadium included considerations related to
‘public health’ and ‘social cohesion’, given that it wanted
to maintain and develop a ‘sports zone’ in the (…) area’’.77
A ‘normal’ market investor, however, ‘‘would only pur-
chase such a stadium on the basis of a business plan
demonstrating the strong likelihood of a sufficiently prof-
itable exploitation’’.78 Policy objectives, such as public
health and social cohesion are typical for municipalities,
but not for private entities. Consequently, the Commission
concluded that the measures entailed a selective advantage
to MVV and that State aid in the sense of Article 107(1)
TFEU had been granted.
3.1.3 FC Den Bosch
By waiving a claim of €1.65 million and paying a sum of
€1.4 million, the municipality of Den Bosch granted a total
of €3.05 million to FC Den Bosch, directly form State
resources. Although FC Den Bosch is a small club, with no
experience of European competitions,79 it is active on the
(international) transfer market and derives income from
sponsorship and merchandising. Thus, for the Commission,
the State aid granted to FC Den Bosch has the potential to
distort competition and affect trade between Member
States.80 Arguing that the aid measures conferred a selec-
tive advantage to FC Den Bosch required more elaboration
from the Commission, particularly since The Netherlands
found that the municipality acted in accordance with the71 Ibid, paras. 24-28.
72 It reads as follows: ‘‘any aid granted by a Member State or
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or
the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade
between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market’’.
73 For it example, in the 1999/2000 season Willem II participated in
the Champions League.
74 SA.40168, paras. 39–40.
75 SA.40168, paras. 32–33.
76 SA.41612, para. 27. Swapping the debt against the revenues
derived from future transfers of players leaving MVV could be
considered contrary to FIFA’s rules on Third Party Ownership (TPO).
77 SA.41612, para. 35.
78 Ibid.
79 SA.41614, para. 7.
80 Ibid, paras. 62–63.
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MEIP, and consequently did not confer a selective
advantage to FC Den Bosch.81 The Commission agreed
that the starting position of the municipality and the private
operators involved was comparable with regard to the
transaction, i.e. transforming the club’s debt into shares.
Nonetheless, it found it unlikely that ‘‘a private investor
would have agreed to sell its non-recoverable loan which is
swapped into equity for a price of €1 to a foundation’’.82 As
regards the municipality’s acquisition of the training
complex, the Commission highlighted the fact that it was
already the property of the municipality, and that FC Den
Bosch used them without a long leasehold. Therefore, the
valuation of the complex should not have taken place on
the basis of a scenario where FC Den Bosch would have
been the owner of the buildings.
3.1.4 NEC
The Dutch authorities provided a rather elaborate argument
on the question whether the acquisition of NEC’s purchase
option for €2.2 million constituted State aid. It argued that
the purchase option was subject to Dutch law and should,
consequently, only be evaluated by a Dutch court. Since
this agreement is based on a general measure under Dutch
law,83 the measure can never be selective.84 Moreover,
Dutch law stipulates that, where no price is agreed between
parties, the buyer has to pay a reasonable price. The
Netherlands held that €2.2 million was reasonable, because
the price was based on independent valuations. In other
words, the municipality acted in accordance with the MEIP
when it bought NEC’s purchase option.85
The Commission, however, disagreed with the Nether-
lands. Even though the contract between Nijmegen and
NEC is based on Dutch law, that agreement is also based
on ‘‘the specific provisions of the contract between NEC
and the municipality’’.86 This makes the acquisition of the
purchase option selective. Regarding the Dutch authorities’
claim that Nijmegen acted as a typical market investor, the
Commission did not understand why the value of the
purchase option should equal the value of the sport com-
plex. The Commission further noted that NEC remained
the operator of the stadium even after waiving the purchase
option, which allowed it to receive the same revenues.87
Therefore, the Commission held that the compensation for
NEC waiving the purchase option should have been con-
siderably lower than €2.2 million, though it could not
determine the exact amount on the basis of the information
provided by the Netherlands.88
3.2 Valencia CF
First of all, even though the State guarantees were placed
on loans granted to La Fundacio´n del Valencia Club de
Fu´tbol, the Commission considered that the football club
Valencia CF ultimately benefited from these guarantees.89
In line with the Commission’s consideration, this article
shall therefore refer to Valencia CF as the recipient of the
State aid.
The granting of State guarantees is considered a transfer
of State resources in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU,
because the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by
the State. If the undertaking concerned does not properly
remunerate the creditor, the State will lose financial
resources.90 The fact that Valencia CF defaulted on its
interest payment of €6 million in 2010, which led to an
additional bank loan plus State guarantee, demonstrates the
sort of burden that is placed upon the State guaranteeing
such loans. The main question in this case was, however,
whether Valencia CF obtained a selective advantage by
means of the State guarantees. Said differently, did the
Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas, act in accordance with
the MEIP?
In its submissions to the Commission, Spain claimed
that the IVF did act like a proper market investor, because
the club’s economic prospects were good at the time the aid
was granted ‘‘especially from the operations of the club’s
new stadium’’.91 Moreover, the fact that Meriton Holdings
Limited bought La Fundacio´n’s shares in 2014 for €100
million, thereby granting La Fundacio´n a profit of nearly
€8 million, further demonstrated Valencia CF’s healthy
economic prospects. In addition, Spain argued that the
provisions of the 2008 Guarantee Notice were complied
with, since the guarantee fees of the loans (i.e. the annual
guarantee premium of 0.5% and a one-off 1% commitment
fee) were at market level.92
In its submission as an interested (third) party, Valencia
CF went a step further and claimed that it was not in
financial difficulty at the time of the guarantees’ granting.
Although the club did have a negative equity during the
81 Ibid, paras. 17–30.
82 Ibid, para. 53.
83 The agreement is based on Article 6:217 of the Dutch Civil Code,
which, according to the Netherlands, has a general scope and is
applicable to all undertakings.
84 SA.41617, paras. 24-29.
85 Ibid, paras. 30-36.
86 Ibid, para. 49.
87 Ibid, para. 57.
88 Ibid, para. 65.
89 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 32.
90 Commission Notice on State aid in the form of guarantees, point
2.1.
91 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 39.
92 Ibid, para. 38.
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2007–2009 period, the club argued that the Commission
failed to assess Valencia CF’s real economic situation
correctly. Importantly, the club held that the aggregated
book value of the club’s registered football players (pur-
chase cost minus annual amortization) is not representative
of the real market value of these players. Where the book
value, as reflected in the club’s 2008/09 accounts, was
‘only’ €95.7 million, the overall market value of the
players (as estimated by Valencia CF) was approximately
€235.7 million. Such an elevated market value, together
with the fact that Valencia CF made a profit of €64.2
million on the transfer market in the financial year 2010,93
shows that the club was not in financial difficulty.94
Valencia CF’s argument is particularly interesting and
requires further elaboration. A State guarantee that complies
with the conditions set in the 2008 Guarantee Notice will be
considered not to entail an economic advantage in the sense of
Article 107(1) TFEU. Consequently, that measure will not be
considered to constitute State aid. As can be read from point
3.2 (a) of the Notice, the first condition that needs to be
compliedwith is that the borrowing firm in question cannot be
in financial difficulty when the State guarantee is provided.
The Commission’s reasoning behind this rule is that a State
guarantee may help a failing firm remain active instead of
being eliminated or restructured, thereby possibly creating
distortions of competition.95 If the borrowing firm is in
financial difficulty, however, the State guarantee could be
considered possible compatible State aid under the 2004
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.96 Although the next
section of this article will elaborate further on the Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines, at this stage one cannot underesti-
mate the importance for the Member State granting the State
guarantee to know whether the recipient is in financial diffi-
culty or not, due to the different conditions and procedures
applicable to one and the other, i.e. Notice on State guarantees
or Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. In that regard, in
order to avoid possible State aid problems, the Commission
recommends notification of the planned guarantee by the
Member State concerned,97 something that neither the Span-
ish public authorities norValenciaCFdidwhen implementing
the measure.98
The importance of this distinction is demonstrated by
the Commission’s conclusion that Valencia CF was, in
fact, in financial difficulty before the measures under
scrutiny were implemented.99 Keeping in mind the content
of the 2009 Viability Plan, which included measures
specifically aimed at restoring economic viability,100 this
conclusion can hardly come as a surprise. Indeed, Spain
itself acknowledged that Valencia CF was in financial
difficulty in 2009.101 It is therefore somewhat surprising
that the club is insisting otherwise. Although there is no EU
law definition of what constitutes a firm in difficulty,102 it
is established case law that the existence of negative own
capital may be considered an important indicator that an
undertaking is in a difficult financial situation.103 Further-
more, the Commission noted that the high book value of
Valencia CF’s football players does not mean that the club
was not in financial difficulty. It stated that the ‘‘fire sale
value104 of the same players would be relatively low
because buyers would use the known fact of Valencia CF’s
difficulties in order to push for low prices. In addition,
players’ market value depends largely on random events
like injuries etc., which makes such market value consid-
erably volatile.’’105 Consequently, the criterion established
in point 3.2 (a) of the Notice on State guarantees was not
met.
The Notice on State guarantees further elucidates that a
guarantee cannot cover more than 80% of the outstanding
loan.106 As is explained in Sect. 2.2 of this article, both
guarantees provided by the IVF covered 100% of the bank
loans, meaning that this condition was also not complied
with. Furthermore, the Commission held that ‘‘the annual
guarantee premiums of 0.5–1% charged for the guarantees
in question cannot be considered as reflecting the risk of
default for the guaranteed loans, given the (financial) dif-
ficulty of Valencia CF’’.107 In other words, the guarantee
93 According to Valencia CF, it sold players for €78.7 million,
whereas spending on new signings totalled €14.5 million.
94 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 46 (under
(c)).
95 Commission Notice on State aid in the form of guarantees, point
2.2.
96 Communication from the Commission of 1 October 2004 (2004/C
244/02) Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and
Restructuring firms in difficulty, point 11.
97 Commission Notice on State aid in the form of guarantees, point
3.6.
98 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 96.
99 Ibid, paras. 71-82.
100 See Sect. 2.2 above.
101 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 42. As was
explained in Sect. 2.2, Valencia CF suffered losses of €26.1 million
and €59.2 million in the financial years ending in June 2007 and June
2009, respectively, while its annual turnover decreased from €107.6
million in 2007 to €99.4 million in 2008 down to €82.4 million in
2009.
102 Quigley (2015), p 405. See also e.g. T-349/03, Corsica Ferries
France v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:221, para. 183.
103 T-102/07, Freistaat Sachsen v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2010:62,
para. 106.
104 A fire sale is the sale of assets at discounted prices, typically when
the seller faces bankruptcy.
105 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 82.
106 Commission Notice on State aid in the form of guarantees, point
3.2 (c).
107 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 86.
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fees were not established at market level, and therefore
constitute an economic advantage for Valencia CF.
The Commission further disagreed with Spain’s claim
that the IVF acted in accordance with the MEIP due to the
2009 viability plan. Firstly, the plan did not include a
sensitivity analysis of the risks that could have an impact
on the financial performance of the football club, such as
positions in La Liga’s rankings, changes on the transfer
market and, most importantly in this case, changes in prices
on the real estate market.108 Secondly, the viability plan
‘‘did not include any elements of recovery of Valencia CF
from its annual losses or significantly high levels of debt
and lacked credible and elaborated financial forecasts that a
sound and credible viability plan should include’’.109 The
lack of a credible viability would prevent a ‘‘normal’’
market economic investor of providing a guarantee on a
loan in similar fashion as the IVF.
Finally, the fact that Meriton bought La Fundacio´n’s
shares in 2014 for €100 million is irrelevant for the
Commission, because a purchase of shares that took place
that long after the State guarantees were provided is not
representative of the club’s financial situation in 2009 and
2010.110
All of the above led the Commission to conclude that
the two State guarantees entailed State aid granted to
Valencia CF. The next step of the Commission’s analysis
was deciding whether the measures could be declared
compatible with the internal market.
4 The rules on compatibility
The general prohibition of Article 107(1) TFEU is neither
absolute nor unconditional.111 When a measure qualifies as
State aid, the Member State concerned has the opportunity
to prove that the conditions for the application of one of the
derogations apply. In the case of the professional football
sector, where a measure fulfils the criteria of Article 107(1)
TFEU, the Member State in question will likely use the
provision in Article 107(3)(c) TFEU to derogate from the
general prohibition.112 Pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU,
aid to facilitate the development of certain economic
activities, where such aid does not adversely affect trading
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest,
may be considered compatible with the internal market.
Only the Commission has the competence (subject to
control by the EU Courts) to determine whether or not
certain aid merits derogation from the general prohibition
of Article 107(1).113 However, it is settled case law that it
is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds of
compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for
such compatibility are met.114 Due to its own wide dis-
cretion to assess the compatibility, the Commission has
developed its own methodologies and approaches over the
years, found in the decisional practice, policy documents115
and sector specific guidelines.116
4.1 The rescue and restructuring guidelines
As regards the compatibility assessment of State aid mea-
sures granted with the objective to rescue (and restructure)
firms in financial difficulty, the Commission devised a set
of rules known as the Community Guidelines on State aid
for rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty (hereinafter:
‘‘Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines’’). The first Guide-
lines were published in 1994 and primarily serve as a tool
for the Commission to assess similar cases in a similar way.
The criteria and conditions laid down in the Guidelines are
mostly based on the Commission’s own experience in
dealing with cases involving State aid in favour of firms in
difficulty and case law by the Court of Justice of the EU.117
Due to the continuous developments in the area of EU State
aid law, the Guidelines are regularly updated.118 However,
and as was already explained in the introduction, this
article will mostly refer to the 2004 Rescue and
108 Ibid, para. 58.
109 Ibid, para. 59.
110 Ibid, para. 60.
111 Quigley (2015), pp 193-194.
112 Aid could also be declared compatible under 107 (3)(a), (b) and
(d) TFEU, but these provisions are less relevant for the football
sector.
113 According to settled case law, national courts do not have the
power to declare a State aid measure compatible with the internal
market. See e.g. C-354/90, Fe´de´ration Nationale du Commerce
Exte´rieur des Produits Alimentaires and Syndicat National des
Ne´gociants et Transformateurs de Saumon v French Republic,
ECLI:EU:C:1991:440, para. 14.
114 SA.41612, para. 42; see also Case C-364/90, Italy v Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:1993:157, point 20.
115 See for example Communication from the Commission
COM(2012) of 8 May 2012 to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions – EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), para. 12.
116 See for example the Communication from the Commission OJ
C25/01 of 26 January 2013 on the EU Guidelines for the application
of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband
networks, paras. 32-34.
117 Slot (2012), page 914. Indeed, a large amount of cases used for
the first Guidelines of 1994 derive from aid granted to undertakings in
the former German Democratic Republic that suffered financially
after Germany’s reunification.
118 The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines published in 2014 are
the fourth of its sort after earlier versions published in 1994, 1999 and
2004.
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Restructuring Guidelines,119 since these were applicable to
the State aid measures analyzed.
The Guidelines can be considered as one of the most
important soft law documents in the field of State aid,
because rescuing and/or restructuring an undertaking
through State aid is potentially one of the most distortive
types of State aid.120 It allows a company to survive where
normal play of market forces would have resulted in it
ceasing activities and leaving the market. Keeping a
company alive can be highly beneficial for employees and
customers in the short-run on the one hand, but it is
questionable whether it is worth rescuing an inefficient
company at the expense of the taxpayers and long run
health of the economy on the other hand.121
Given that its very existence is in danger, a firm in
difficulty cannot be considered as an appropriate vehicle
for promoting other public policy objectives.122 Conse-
quently, the compatibility of aid intended to financially
strengthen firms in financial difficulty is to be determined
solely under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, and
not under other sector specific guidelines drafted by the
Commission.123
Rescue aid is commonly defined as temporary assistance
to keep an ailing firm afloat for the time needed to work out
a restructuring plan.124 Restructuring aid, for its part, will
be based on a feasible, coherent and far-reaching plan to
restore a firm’s long-term viability,125 and cannot, in
principle, take place during the rescue phase.126 However,
it is widely acknowledged that the rescue and the restruc-
turing are often two parts of a single operation, even if they
involve different processes.127 Firms in difficulty may
already need to take certain urgent structural measures to
halt or reduce a worsening of the financial situation in the
rescue phase.128 The possibility to combine rescue – and
restructuring aid into one operation is also evident from the
cases involving State aid granted to professional football
clubs in financial difficulty analysed in this article. As will
be shown below, in its assessment the Commission does
not make a distinction between one and the other.
4.1.1 The notification obligation and the qualification
of a firm in difficulty
In the 2004 Guidelines, the Commission sets out the con-
ditions under which State aid for rescuing and restructuring
undertakings in difficulty may be considered compatible
with the internal market. These conditions include the
notification obligation for the Member State,129 as well as
demonstrating that the firm qualifies as ‘a firm in diffi-
culty’. As is explained above in Sect. 3.2, there is no exact
definition under EU law of a firm in difficulty. Nonetheless,
these Guidelines do stipulate that a firm is regarded in
difficulty if, inter alia, more than half of its registered
capital has disappeared, or where it fulfils the criteria under
its domestic law for being the subject of collective insol-
vency proceedings.130 In any case, a firm may still be
considered in financial difficulty where the ‘usual’ signs of
a firm being in difficulty are present (such as increasing
losses, diminishing turnover and mounting debt), and
when, without intervention by the State, it will almost
certainly be condemned to going out of business in the
short or medium term.131
4.1.2 The restructuring plan and large enterprises
versus SMEs
Section 3.2 of the Guidelines requires that the grant of the
aid must be conditional on the implementation of a
restructuring plan, which must be communicated to the
Commission.132 This restructuring plan, which is aimed at
restoring the long-term viability of the firm within a rea-
sonable timescale and on the basis of realistic assumptions
as to future operating conditions, will require the full
commitment by the Member State concerned.133 The plan
must take account of the future (financial) prospects, with
scenarios reflecting best-case, worst-case assumptions, and
must provide for a turnaround that will enable the firm,
after completing its restructuring, to cover all its costs.134
If the firm in financial difficulty is considered a ‘large
enterprise’, the restructuring plan will have to be approved
by the Commission.135 A restructuring plan concerning a
119 Communication from the Commission of 1 October 2004 (2004/C
244/02) Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and
Restructuring firms in difficulty.
120 Buts et al. (2016), page 338.
121 Valle and Van de Casteele (2004), page 9.
122 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 20.
123 Craven (2014a), page 585.
124 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 6.
125 Ibid, point 17.
126 Ibid, point 6.
127 Valle and Van de Casteele (2004), page 9.
128 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 6.
129 Ibid, point 25(c).
130 Ibid, point 10.
131 Ibid, point 11. See also Quigley (2015), page 405.
132 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 34.
133 Ibid, points 35.
134 Ibid, points 36-37.
135 Ibid, point 34.
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small or medium-sized enterprise, on the other hand, does
not need to be endorsed by the Commission.136 As is
stipulated in the 2003 Recommendation concerning the
Definition of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enter-
prises,137 a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise
which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual
turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed
€10 million, whereas a medium-sized enterprise is defined
as an enterprise which employs fewer than 250 persons and
which has an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million,
and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43
million. A large enterprise, therefore, employs more than
250 persons, has an annual turnover exceeding €50 million
and/or has an annual balance sheet total that exceeds €43
million. It is important to note that the conditions in the
Recommendation are cumulative. In other words, if one of
the conditions is not met (e.g. the firm employs less than
250 persons, but has an annual turnover of more than €50
million), then the firm in question is considered a ‘large
enterprise’ and not a ‘medium-sized enterprise’.
4.1.3 Aid limited to the minimum
The condition that aid needs to be limited aid to what is
strictly necessary and the introduction of compensatory
measures have the aim of ensuring that the State aid
measure is proportionate to the objective tackled, namely
rescuing and/or restructuring a firm in difficulty.
The Member States granting the restructuring aid will
have to limit the amount and intensity of the aid to the strict
minimum of the restructuring costs necessary to enable
restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing
financial resources of the firm.138 This also means that the
beneficiaries are expected to make a significant contribu-
tion to the restructuring plan from their own resources.139
The Commission will normally consider the following
contributions to the restructuring to be appropriate: at least
25% in the case of small enterprises, at least 40% for
medium-sized enterprises and at least 50% for large
firms.140
4.1.4 Compensatory measures
The Guidelines also stipulate that, in case the firm in dif-
ficulty is considered a medium-sized enterprise or larger,
compensatory measures must be taken by the Member State
that grants the rescue and/or restructuring aid in order to
ensure that the adverse effects on trading conditions are
minimized as much as possible, so that the positive effects
pursued outweigh the adverse ones.141 The compensatory
measures should take place in the market sector (or sectors)
where the firm has a market position and which affect the
beneficiary’s presence on that market.142 Importantly
moreover, these measures cannot consist of write-offs and/
or closure of loss-making activities which would at any rate
be necessary to restore viability of the firm. These measures
will not be considered reduction of capacity or market
presence for the purpose of the assessment of the compen-
satory measure.143 To give an example, in November 2015
the Commission rejected as an adequate compensatory
measure Estonia Air’s proposal to stop flying certain routes
with the objective of reducing its air capacity. According to
the Commission, ‘‘in order for those routes to be counted as
compensatory measures, they must be profitable because
otherwise they would have been cancelled in any event for
viability reasons’’.144 In other words, Estonia Air was to a
large extent in financial difficulty thanks to flying certain
unprofitable routes. The decision not to fly these routes
anymore should not be seen as a compensatory measure, but
rather as a restructuring measure.
4.1.5 The ‘‘one time, last time’’ principle
Last but not least, the so-called ‘one time, last time’
principle prevails. In its case law, the General Court found
this principle of particular importance in the assessment of
the compatibility of restructuring aid with the internal
market.145 An undertaking that needs a second shot of
rescue and/or restructuring aid demonstrates that its diffi-
culties are either of a recurrent nature or were not dealt
with adequately before.146 The ‘one time, last time’
136 Ibid, point 59.
137 Annex of the Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003
(2003/361/EC) concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises, is also used in the Rescue and Restructuring
Guidelines, Article 2.
138 Ibid, point 25(d).
139 By ‘‘own resources’’ the Commission also understands funding
from external financiers at market conditions.
140 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, points 43-44.
141 Ibid, point 38.
142 Commission Decision SA.37792 of 8 June 2016 on the State Aid
which Slovenia is planning to implement for the Cimos Group, para.
166, and T-115/09 and T-116/09, Electrolux and Whirlpool
(FagorBrandt), ECLI:EU:T:2012:76, para. 53.
143 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 40.
144 Commission Decision 36868 of 6 November 2015 on the
measures which Estonia is planning to implement for AS Estonian
Air, para. 194.
145 Case T-511/09, Niki Luftfahrt GmbH v Commission
ECLI:EU:T:2015:284, para 115.
146 Quigley (2015), p 406.
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principle should not be interpreted entirely literally, since,
as is written in the Guidelines, in practice this actually
means that rescue or restructuring aid can only be granted
once every 10 years.147
5 The compatibility of the rescue aid
to professional football clubs (re-) assessed
5.1 The four Dutch football clubs
Even though it was the Netherlands’ task to invoke possible
grounds of compatibility and to demonstrate that the con-
ditions for such compatibility were met, the aid granted to
all four Dutch football clubs was never notified. The
Netherland’s failure to fulfil its notification obligation,
therefore, appears to be at odds with the Commission’s final
decision to declare the aid compatible with EU law. Yet, a
closer look at the Commission’s decision of 6 March 2013 to
launch the formal investigation shows that the Commission
was giving the Netherlands a ‘second chance’ to invoke
grounds that would lead to a justification of the measures. In
paragraph 74, the Commission itself reached the conclusions
that the clubs in question faced financial difficulties, con-
sequently indicating that the Rescue and Restructuring
Guidelines might apply. In fact, the Commission even sug-
gested possible compensatory measures, which are very
much related to ‘‘the peculiar nature of professional foot-
ball’’.148 These suggested compensatory measures included:
– Limiting the club’s number of registered players for a
season or several seasons;
– Accepting a cap on the relation between salaries and
turnover;
– Banning the payment of transfer fees for a certain
period;
– Offering additional expenditure on ‘‘pro bono’’ activ-
ities to the benefit of the community and training of
amateurs.149
Furthermore, it invited the Dutch authorities ‘‘to provide
all useful information allowing the Commission to decide
whether the aid measures can be considered compatible
with the Guidelines’’.150
The observations and information submitted by the
Netherlands between March 2013 and July 2016 proved
more than sufficient for the Commission to carry out its
compatibility assessment. As was insinuated in the decision
to launch a formal investigation, the 2004 Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines proved fundamental to this
assessment.
5.1.1 The Dutch football clubs as firms in financial
difficulty
This first condition of the Guidelines was easily complied
with. As regards Willem II, in the accounting year
2008/2009, it made a loss of €3.9 million on a turnover of
€11.4 million. Meanwhile, its own equity decreased from
€4.1 million to €200.000. The losses increased to €4.4
million on a turnover of €9.9 million for the 2009/2010
season, while its own equity decreased further from
€200.000 to minus €2.1 million.151
MVV was clearly not doing much better. As the Com-
mission itself summarizes in the MVV decision, ‘‘in
2008/2009, MVV made a loss of €1.1 million and its own
equity was minus €3.8 million. By March 2010 additional
losses amounting to €1.3 million had occurred and the own
equity had dropped to minus €5.17 million. In April 2010,
MVV was no longer able to pay salaries and other current
expenditure and was on the brink of bankruptcy.’’152
In 2010, FC Den Bosch had a negative equity of €4.6
million, a figure that increased to €5.4 million in 2011.
Furthermore, its losses were constantly increasing, while its
turnover was constantly decreasing. By the end of 2010 it
became clear that, without financial assistance, the club
would go bankrupt.153
The description of the financial situation of NEC in the
opening decision and in the final decision is more peculiar.
In the opening decision, the Dutch authorities had explic-
itly argued that NEC was not in financial difficulty, a
statement contradicted by the Commission.154 An analysis
of the comments made by the Netherlands during the for-
mal investigation shows a U-turn in this regard. The Dutch
government put forward evidence demonstrating that NEC
had a negative equity, a negative development of working
capital and declining incomes.155 The Commission
acknowledged the evidence provided and concluded that
147 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 25(e) and Sect. 3.3.
148 Commission Decision on State Aid SA.40168 of 4 July 2016
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club Willem II in Tilburg, para. 50.
149 Commission Decision SA.33584 of 6 March 2013 – The
Netherlands Alleged municipal aid to the Professional Dutch football
clubs Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in
2008-2011, para. 80.
150 Ibid, para. 77.
151 SA.40168, para. 45.
152 Commission Decision on State Aid SA.41612 of 4 July 2016
implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football
club MVV in Maastricht, para. 13.
153 SA.41614, paras.8-9.
154 SA.33584, para. 49.
155 SA.41617, para. 40. The exact figures of NEC’s financial situation
are kept confidential.
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NEC was a football club in financial difficulty at the
moment the aid was granted.156
Another consequence of being in financial difficulty
relates to the licensing system put in place by the Dutch
football federation KNVB. As is explained in paragraph 11
of the decision to open a formal investigation, one of the
obligations for clubs under the current system is submitting
three financial reports a year to the KNVB. On the basis of
these reports clubs are scaled in three categories (I: insuf-
ficient, II: sufficient, III: good). Clubs in category I may be
obliged to present a plan for improvement in order to reach
categories II or III. If the club fails to comply with the plan,
sanctions may be imposed by the KNVB, including an
official warning, a reduction of competition points and – as
ultimate sanction – withdrawal of the licence.157 As can be
read in the Commission’s decisions, at the time the State
aid was granted, Willem II MVV and NEC were all scaled
in the insufficient category I.158 Moreover, given FC Den
Bosch’s critical financial situation at the time the aid
measures were granted in 2010 and 2011,159 one can safely
assume that the KNVB had scaled the club in category I as
well.
5.1.2 The Dutch football clubs as small enterprises
or medium-sized enterprises
This particular assessment is important for the two condi-
tions below, i.e. the introduction of restructuring plans and
compensatory measures. Depending on the size of the firm
(or enterprise), different conditions apply.
Willem II and NEC are both medium-sized enterprises.
Willem II employed 53 people in 2012 and had an annual
turnover of €11.4 million in 2008/2009.160 Pursuant to the
Annex of the Commission Recommendation concerning
the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enter-
prises, Willem II just managed to be considered a medium-
sized enterprise.161 NEC, meanwhile, had a fluctuating
number of 60-70 employees between 2010 and 2015, and is
thus a medium-sized enterprise.162
MVV and FC Den Bosch are, on the other hand, con-
sidered small enterprises. In the season 2009/2010, MVV
had 38 employees and in the season 2010/2011 it had 35
employees. Its turnover and balance sheet total remained
well below €10 million in both years.163 FC Den Bosch is
even smaller, having only 31 employees in 2011/2012. Its
turnover and balance sheet was €3 million for that year.164
5.1.3 Restructuring plans
Though not initially communicated to the Commission, all
rescue measures imposed restructuring conditions. In
principle, these consisted of reducing personnel costs by
introducing new managements, selling players, and signing
players free of transfer payments. By way of reminder,
restructuring plans concerning SMEs do not need to be
approved by the Commission under the 2004 Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines.165
In the case of Willem II, in the two years following the
rescue measure personnel costs were reduced by 30%.166
The effects of MVV’s restructuring plan were even stron-
ger, since it managed to book profits for the three seasons
following the aid and was scaled in the highest category
(III) by the KNVB at the beginning of the season
2011/2012.167 FC Den Bosch too promised to cut staff and
players, while abstaining from paying transfer fees for new
players,168 but also abandoned its training to reduce
costs.169 As part of its restructuring plan, NEC limited
salaries of new players and reduced bonuses. Furthermore,
as is stated in the NEC decision, ‘‘any investments in
immaterial or mater fixed assets of more than [a certain
amount] had to be agreed by the KNVB license commis-
sion, which actually meant that NEC could not do any
transfers’’.170
5.1.4 Compensatory measures
For the compensatory measures it is important to take into
account point 41 of the Rescue and Restructuring Guide-
lines. Under this provision, small enterprises, such as MVV
and FC Den Bosch, are not required to take compensatory
measures. However, this exception did not apply to Willem
II and NEC. In this regard, the Commission noted more
expenditure by Willem II on the training of amateurs and a
reduction of the number of registered players from 31 to
156 Ibid, para. 73.
157 SA.33584, para. 11.
158 SA.40168, para. 22; SA.41612, para. 52; and SA.41617, para. 76.
159 SA.41614, paras.8-9.
160 SA.40168, para. 9.
161 A firm is not considered a small enterprise if it has more than 50
employees and an annual turnover of more than €10 million. Supra
note 137.
162 SA.41617, para. 7.
163 SA.41612, para. 9.
164 SA.41614, para. 7.
165 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in
difficulty, point 59.
166 SA.40168, para. 48.
167 SA.41612, para. 52.
168 SA.41614, para. 38. It appears that FC Den Bosch has kept this
promise, since, according to www.transfermarkt.de, it has not paid a
transfer fee since 2006. Accessed 18 October 2016.
169 SA.41614, paras. 34 and 70.
170 SA.41617, para. 77.
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27. Similarly, no transfer payments were made during the
restructuring period.171 Potentially as a result of this,
Willem II was relegated to the second league in 2011 and
again in 2013. In the end, the Commission concluded that
‘‘the compensatory measures required by the Guidelines
were taken, which had the effect of weakening Willem II’s
competitive position in professional football’’.172 Regard-
ing NEC, the Commission noted the cost reduction of
wages below 60% of the turnover level.173 With this, the
Commission referred to its suggested compensatory mea-
sures as found in the opening decision,174 but also indi-
rectly referred to UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Rules, which
foresees that the cost of salaries should not exceed 70% of
turnover.175 Such a salary reduction weakened the com-
petitive position of NEC,176 and was thus accepted by the
Commission as a compensatory measure in the sense of the
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.177
5.1.5 Aid limited to a minimum
Since the aid measures rescued both football clubs from
bankruptcy without creating equity surplus, the Commission
believed the amount of aid granted limited to what was nec-
essary. Furthermore, the Commission highlighted that the
restructuring plans were to a large extent financed by external
contributors just as the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines
requested. Private entities had agreed to lend €2.25 million to
Willem II for the restructuring, which is well over the 40% of
€2.4 million (the total amount of State aid granted) required
for medium-sized enterprises under the Guidelines.178 In the
case ofMVV, several private creditors decided to waive (part
of) their debt, which amounted to €2.25 million. This amount
is more than 25% of the €5.8 million granted by the Nether-
lands, the minimum requirement for a small enterprise like
MVV.179 Private contributions for the rescue of FC Den
Bosch amounted to €3.7 million, also more than 25% of the
€3.1 million granted by the municipality.180
5.1.6 The ‘‘one time, last time’’ principle
The Commission believes this condition to be fulfilled, as
the Netherlands specified that the four Dutch clubs con-
cerned did not receive rescue or restructuring aid in the ten
years before the aid measures, nor will it award any new
rescue or restructuring aid to the clubs during a period of
ten years.181
5.2 Valencia CF
As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that the State
guarantees were never notified to the Commission.182
Although not meeting the notification obligation qualifies
the aid measures prima facie as ‘‘unlawful’’, this does not
mean that the measures are automatically incompatible, as
the Dutch cases have shown. In this respect, Spain con-
sidered that if the Commission were to find State aid in the
State guarantees (which the Commission did), these mea-
sures would be compatible as restructuring aid under the
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.183 The following
paragraphs will explain why the Commission concluded
that the criteria of the Guidelines were not complied with.
5.2.1 Valencia CF as a firm in financial difficulty
The ‘firm in financial difficulty’ criterion was the only
condition complied with. This is undoubtedly rather ironic,
given that, as is stated in Sect. 3.2 of this article, Valencia
CF continuously emphasized that it was not in financial
difficulty. This point of view is not only contrary to the
Commission’s, but also to Spain’s, which held that the club
was very much in financial difficulty.184 In any case, the
fact that Valencia CF suffered losses of over €70 million
while seeing its turnover decrease from €107.6 million to
€82.4 million between 2007 and 2009,185 cannot be denied.
171 SA.40168, para. 51. Indeed, according to www.transfermarkt.de,
Willem II only paid a mere €20.000 for the signing of Kevin Brands
in July 2012. Accessed 14 October 2016.
172 Ibid.
173 SA.41617, para. 82.
174 SA.33584, para. 80.
175 UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations,
Edition 2015, Article 62(4).
176 Indeed, following the aid measure of September 2010, it
gradually started performing worse in the national league, culminat-
ing with a relegation to the second league at the end of the 2013/2014
season. It was the only relegation in more than 20 years.
177 SA.41617, para. 82.
178 SA.40168, para. 52.
179 SA.41612, para. 54.
180 SA.41614, para. 72.
181 SA.40168, para. 55 and SA.41612, para. 61.
182 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 96.
183 Ibid, para. 104. Valencia CF itself argued that the first State
guarantee was in line with the Communication from the Commission
(2009/C 83/01) of 7 April 2009 - Temporary Community framework
for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current
financial and economic crisis, and therefore compatible under Article
107(3)b) TFEU. The Commission, however rejected this argument,
because this Framework does not apply to firms that were in financial
difficulty before 1 July 2008 (Sect. 4.2.2. of the Framework).
According to the Commission, Valencia CF was already in financial
difficulty in 2007 (Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016,
para. 99). The club made no attempt to argue that the measures
needed to be declared compatible under the 2004 Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines.
184 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 42 and 104.
185 Ibid, paras. 15 and 75. See also Sect. 3.2.
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5.2.2 Valencia CF as a large enterprise
Although Valencia CF’s annual turnover diminished from
€107.6 million to €82.4 million between 2007 and 2009, it
still exceeded the threshold of €50 million needed to be
considered a ‘medium-sized enterprise’ in the sense of the
2003 Recommendation concerning the Definition of Micro,
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Thus, Valencia CF is
considered to be a ‘large enterprise’.
5.2.3 Restructuring plans
Contrary to the Dutch cases, as a consequence of falling in
the category of ‘large enterprises’, any restructuring plan
submitted by Spain needed the Commission’s approval.186
Spain and Valencia CF’s restructuring plan, or the 2009
Viability Plan as it became known, included reduced
expenditure in the football squad, the sale of land plots and
the sale of players’ rights during the first two years of the
plan. According to the plan, these measures would allow
the club to start making operating profits again by June
2013.187 However, the plan did not include the best-case,
worst-case scenario required under the Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines.188 In its decision, the Commis-
sion noted the possible risks that could impact Valencia
CF’s restructuring, namely ‘‘the effect of the club’s dif-
ferent possible placements in the championships final
ranking, changes in the prices in the real estate market, in
the sponsoring market or in the broadcasting market,
potential risks regarding the ability of fans to pay season or
single-match tickets, injury risks of players, changes in the
market of players’ transfers etc.’’.189 Another point of
criticism was the assumption that long term viability would
not be restored until four years after the granting of the first
State guarantee. The Commission believed this not to be
within a ‘‘reasonable time-scale’’ in the sense of the Rescue
and Restructuring Guidelines.190
5.2.4 Compensatory measures
As a compensatory measure, Spain proposed that Valencia
CF were to sell its most valuable football players.191 An
analysis of the club’s transfer activities during the transfer
windows following the granting of the first State guarantee
showed that the club indeed sold its most valuable players.
David Villa was sold in the summer of 2010 for €40 mil-
lion, while, according to Transfermarkt, having a market
value of €45 million. That same summer, Valencia CF sold
David Silva, who at that time had a market value of €32
million, for ‘only’ €28.5 million. The following year, Juan
Mata was sold for €26 million, though this figure actually
represented his market value. The income from selling
players totalled €117.25 million the two years following
the granting of the first State guarantee. Simultaneously,
and deviating from the Dutch cases, Valencia CF did not
abstain from buying players during the ‘restructuring per-
iod’, and spent a total of €61.85 million in this same
period.192
As can be read in the decision, the Commission did not
approve the proposed (and perhaps carried out) compen-
satory measures. The Commission referred to Spain and
Valencia CF’s own Viability Plan, which stated that one of
the reasons that the club was in a difficult economic situ-
ation was, in fact, the loss-making in buying and selling
players’ rights.193 Given that the sales of players like Villa
and Silva were part of the club’s loss-making activity,
‘‘those sales cannot be considered as bringing a reduction
of capacity or performance in Valencia’s profitable areas of
activity. (…) Even if those sales could ultimately benefit a
competitor, their primary aim was to enable the recovery of
Valencia. Therefore, they cannot be considered as bringing
any benefit to Valencia CF’s competitors.’’194 In summary,
the sale of Valencia CF’s most valuable players was con-
sidered a necessary restructuring measure, not a compen-
satory measure. Rejecting the selling of a club’s most
valuable players as an adequate compensatory measure
might appear counterproductive. Especially in the case of
Valencia CF, a team which has consistently sold its best
players to its main competitors since the State aid measures
were implemented, thereby making itself clearly less
competitive. Furthermore, it might not be unreasonable to
think that the club deserved the benefit of the doubt, since
the Commission itself did not exactly know in 2012 what
compensatory measures were to be considered accept-
able.195 However, and as will be further explained below in
Sect. 6, based on the information available one does get the
impression that the Spanish authorities, as well as the club
concerned, did a poor job at realising that the mere selling
of players would be deemed insufficient under the Rescue
and Restructuring Guidelines.
186 Ibid, para. 106.
187 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, paras. 23-24.
188 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 36.
189 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 110.
190 Ibid, para. 111.
191 Ibid, para. 116.
192 All these figures were taken from www.transfermarkt.de.
Accessed 20 December 2016.
193 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 23.
194 Ibid, para. 116.
195 Supra, note 28.
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5.2.5 Aid limited to a minimum
State aid will be considered limited to the minimum when
the beneficiary makes a significant contribution to the
restructuring plan from its own resources. The Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines stipulate that for ‘large firms’,
like Valencia CF, a contribution of at least 50% of the
restructuring costs would be considered appropriate.196 The
total restructuring costs were believed to be €92.4 million
(i.e. the amount obtained in 2009 through the sales of the
club’s shares), but, as is described in Sect. 2.2, club
shareholders only subscribed €18.8 million in these shares.
The Commission noted that €18.8 million equals 20% of
the restructuring costs, an amount well below the recom-
mended 50%.197
5.2.6 The ‘‘one time, last time’’ principle
By way of reminder, the IVF guaranteed two bank loans for
Valencia CF. The first guarantee was granted in November
2009, while the second guarantee was granted November
201o because the club had defaulted on its interest payment
regarding the first bank loan. Due to the fact that the second
guarantee had an ad hoc character and did not form part of
the original restructuring plan in any way, the Commission
considered this guarantee to be a completely new aid
measure. As a consequence, the ‘‘one time, last time’’
principle was not complied with by the Spanish public
authorities.198
5.2.7 The recovery order
On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded
that the measure did not meet the conditions required by
the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, and declared
the State guarantees incompatible with the internal
market. As a consequence of this decision, and in order
to re-establish the situation that existed on the marker
prior to the granted State guarantee, the Commission
ordered Spain to recover from Valencia CF the State
aid.199 On the basis of the Commission’s calculations,
the amount to be recovered totalled €20.381 million for
both State guarantees.200
6 Conclusion: bailing out your local club safely
Notwithstanding the 2009 Viability Plan or the acquisition
of the shares in October 2014 by Meriton Holdings Limited
for €100 million, Valencia CF is still experiencing difficult
times, both on and off the pitch. According to UEFA’s
latest Benchmarking Report (released in January 2017), at
the end of the financial year 2015 Valencia CF had a net
debt of €285 million, an amount which is 3.5 times larger
than its revenue for that same year.201 Moreover, after
ending only 12th in the league at the end of the 2015/16,
the club failed to qualify for European club competitions.
The 2016/17 season is so far proving to be a struggle
against relegation to the second division, with only 12
points won during the first 15 league games. Not qualifying
for European competitions greatly reduced its (yearly)
income, and the club only managed to meet the Financial
Fair Play Requirements by means of a €100 million loan
from its majority shareholder, Meriton.202 The club presi-
dent admitted that the Commission’s recovery of more than
€20 million ‘‘is a third of our income. If we are forced to
pay it would be lethal regarding our possibilities on the
transfer market this winter’’.203
Valencia CF’s decision to bring an action against the
Commission’s decision in front of the General Court of
the EU can therefore hardly come as a surprise, and it is
worthwhile to briefly highlight its first (and most inter-
esting) claim. The club continues to maintain that it was
not in financial difficulty at the time the State guarantee
was granted and that, as such, it had not obtained an
economic advantage in the sense of Article 107(1)
TFEU. The Commission would have erred in its
assessment of Valencia CF’s financial situation. Indeed,
by basing itself on the book value of the players rather
than on their real market value, arguably the Commis-
sion did not take into account ‘‘the specific business
model of football clubs’’.204 Whether or not the General
Court will actually delve into the question of how
players’ market value is to be determined remains to be
196 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 44.
197 Commission Decision SA.36387 of 4 July 2016, para. 121.
198 Ibid, para. 124.
199 Ibid, paras. 126–128.
200 Ibid, para. 93.
201 UEFA Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year
ending 2015, slide 126. http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Down
load/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/42/27/91/2422791_DOWNLOAD.pdf.
Accessed 24 February 2017.
202 Discurso de la Presidenta, Layhoon Chan, en el inicio de la Junta
General Ordinaria de accionistas del Valencia CF S.A.D, page 1. 4
November 2016. http://www.valenciacf.com/bd/archivos/
archivo4148.pdf?nocache=0.664214. Accessed 22 December 2016.
203 David Torres, ‘‘Si pagamos a Bruselas serı´a letal para el mercado
de fichajes’’. El Desmarque, 25 October 2016. http://valencia.
eldesmarque.com/valencia-cf/noticias/18351-si-pagamos-a-bruselas-
seria-letal-para-el-mercado-de-fichajes. Accessed 22 December 2016.
204 Action brought on 20 October 2016 in Case T-732/16, Valencia
Club de Fu´tbol v Commission.
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seen.205 Furthermore, even if the General Court were to
rule that Valencia CF was not in financial difficulty in
2009 and 2010 (i.e. at the time the aid was granted), this
would not automatically mean that no State aid was
granted. As was explained in Sect. 3.2, not being in
financial difficulty is only one criterion that needs to be
complied with in order for the measure not to be con-
sidered State aid under the 2008 Guarantee Notice.206
Valencia CF will still have to demonstrate to the General
Court that the State Guarantee was granted in line with
the other criteria of the Guarantee Notice.
In any case, based on the State aid decisions discussed in
this article, it is nonetheless worth analysing to what extent
elements specific to professional football and its clubs were
taken into account by the Commission in its assessments.
6.1 The Rescue and Restructuring criteria
and professional football
The (current) decisional practice shows that the Commis-
sion takes due account of specific football features when
assessing the proposed or implemented compensatory
measures. The choice for this strategy was already stipu-
lated in its Joint Statement with UEFA from March 2012,
but at that moment the Commission was still in the process
of determining what compensatory measures were to be
considered adequate.207 The opening decision involving
the Dutch football clubs provided more information
regarding the direction the Commission would be taking. In
this decision, the Commission suggested a set of compen-
satory measures that are directly related to professional
football.208 These proposed measures were: (1) limiting the
club’s number of registered players for a season or several
seasons; (2) accepting a cap on the relation between sal-
aries and turnover; (3) banning the payment of transfer fees
for a certain period; and (4) offering additional expenditure
on ‘‘pro bono’’ activities to the benefit of the community
and training of amateurs.209
In the Willem II case, the Commission referred to the
UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regula-
tions210 as well as national (KNVB) licensing rules when
assessing the compensatory measures taken by Willem II.
It endorsed the decision taken by the club not to make
transfer payments during the restructuring period, since this
prevents the club from spending money it might not have,
as well as the reduction of the number of registered players
from 31 to 27. A second reference to UEFA’s FFP rules
(though this time indirect) was made in the NEC case,
when the Commission interpreted the cost reduction of
wages below 60% of the turnover level as an accept-
able compensatory measure.211
Nevertheless, in the Valencia CF case, the mere selling
of the club’s most valuable football players was not con-
sidered an adequate compensatory measure, but rather a
necessary restructuring measure. The fact that the selling of
a club’s best players should be interpreted as a restructur-
ing measure instead of a compensatory measure might be
debatable. Yet, it is true that there are a number of striking
differences between the Valencia case and the Dutch cases.
For example, unlike in the Dutch cases, there is no refer-
ence made to the FFP Regulations or any other specific
footballing rule. Nonetheless, the real important difference
lies in the nature of the compensatory measures. Where the
Dutch clubs abstained from paying sums for players on the
transfer market, Valencia CF continued to do so, spending
€61.85 million.212 Moreover, it is unclear from the Va-
lencia decision whether the club reduced the number of
registered players, nor whether it reduced the costs of
wages/turnover percentage below the 70% required by
UEFA, like Willem II and NEC had done. At this stage, it
is therefore safe to conclude that merely selling players will
not be considered an adequate compensatory measure by
the Commission without additional actions that make the
club less competitive vis-a`-vis its (footballing) competitors.
Be that as it may, a public statement by the Commission,
perhaps together with UEFA like in March 2012, which
includes a non-exclusive list of possible compensatory
measure to be implemented by football clubs in financial
difficulty that are recipient of State aid, could be useful in
order to enhance legal certainty.
205 A CJEU assessment of how the market value of a player should
be calculated could potentially trigger a complex set of questions. For
example, thanks to the website footballleaks it became publicly
known that Valencia CF sold part of the economic rights of at least
one player (i.e. Dorlan Pabo´n) to a third party (Doyen), while the
player was still registered at the club. See https://footballleaks2015.
wordpress.com/2015/12/01/valencia-cf-doyen-sports-dorlan-pabon/.
Accessed 22 December 2016. In other words, how would actively
participating in Third Party Ownership-practices affect the financial
status of a football club?.
206 Commission Notice on State aid in the form of guarantees, point
3.2. (a).
207 By way of reminder, point 13 of the Joint Statement stipulated
that ‘‘one of the key factors that the Commission takes into account is
whether and how the undertaking in question implements compen-
satory measures in the interest of fair competition. Given the
specificity of the sports sector, it is not always straightforward to
envisage such type of potential compensatory measures for football
clubs’’.
208 SA.33584, para. 80. See also SA.40168, para. 50.
209 SA.33584, para. 80.
210 In paragraph 51 of SA.40168, the Commission referred to UEFA
Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, Edition 2015,
Article 62(4), which holds that the cost of salaries should not exceed
70% of total revenue.
211 SA.41617, para. 82.
212 Supra, note 192.
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6.2 Large football clubs versus small and medium-
sized football clubs: unfair competition?
A point that needs to be addressed is the difference in
criteria under the 2004 Rescue and Restructuring Guideli-
nes for small, medium-sized and large enterprises. As is
explained above, restructuring plans for SMEs do not need
to be endorsed by the Commission, while small enterprises
are furthermore not required to implement compensatory
measures.
It is understandable that SMEs were given more flexible
criteria, since State aid measures granted to them are far
more likely to be less distortive, and since SMEs, as the
Commission has held, ‘‘face greater challenges than large
undertakings in terms of access to liquidity’’.213 Yet, the
professional football sector allows for small, medium-sized
and large football clubs to compete directly with each other
within one national league. Take the Dutch highest football
league (Eredivisie) in the 2011/12 Season (the year in
which NEC received State aid) for example. Ajax, the club
that won that year’s league, had a turnover of €97.1 million
and is thus considered a large enterprise.214 NEC, with a
fluctuating number of 60-70 employees between 2010 and
2015, was a medium-sized enterprise.215 Finally, VVV-
Venlo ‘only’ recorded a turnover of €7.794.058 for the
2011/12 season.216 With this figure being less than €10
million, and given that VVV-Venlo had most likely less
than 50 employees, this club should be regarded as a small
enterprise. Subsequently, one could question the fairness of
this discrepancy when considering that three clubs that
directly compete with each other in the same (national)
footballing competition, have three different procedures
applicable to them should they need to receive State aid
under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. Nonethe-
less, as will be explained below in Sect. 6.3, part of this
discrepancy has seized to exist following the latest changes
adopted in the 2014 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
6.3 The 2014 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines:
a game changer?
In 2014 the Commission introduced its fourth Rescue and
Restructuring Guidelines, following its earlier editions of
1994, 1999 and 2004. Although the 2014 Guidelines are
substantially different in several aspects, this section will
only briefly discuss the most important changes in the
Guidelines, especially as regards potential future cases in
the professional football sector.217
6.3.1 Notion of undertaking in difficulty
The first important development related to the notion of
‘undertaking in difficulty’. In these Guidelines, the Com-
mission attempted to significantly simplify this notion, ‘‘by
removing any subjective elements and putting in their place
new, objective criteria’’.218 According to these (exhaustive)
criteria, an undertaking is considered to be in difficulty if at
least one of the following circumstances occurs:
– In the case of a limited liability company, where more
than half of its subscribed share capital has disappeared
as a result of accumulated losses;
– In the case of a company where at least some members
have a unlimited liability for the debt of the company,
where more than half its capital as shown in the
company accounts has disappeared as a result of
accumulated losses;
– Where the undertaking is subject to collective insol-
vency proceedings or fulfils the criteria under its
domestic law for being placed in collective insolvency
proceedings at the request of its creditors;
– In the case of an undertaking that is not an SME, where,
for the past two years, the undertaking’s book debt to
equity ratio has been greater than 7.5 and its earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
interest coverage ratio has been below 1.0.219
Consequently, when an undertaking does not fulfil at
least one of these criteria, it will not be allowed to receive
State aid under the Rescue and Restructuring guidelines.
However, the Commission does provide an ‘escape route’
in point 29 of the 2014 Guidelines by allowing rescue aid
to undertakings that are not in difficulty (in accordance
with the above criteria) but that are facing acute liquidity
213 Communication from the Commission of 31 July 2014 (2014/C
249/01) Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-
financial undertakings in difficulty, point 13.
214 Ajax boekt winst en recordomzet. Ajax, 11 October 2011. http://
www.ajax.nl/streams/ajax-actueel/ajax-boekt-winst-en-recordomzet.
htm. Accessed 9 January 2017.
215 SA.41617, para. 7.






dLFwwNjMoig&bvm=bv.142059868,d.ZGg. Accessed 9 January
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217 For a more elaborate discussion on the changes made in the 2014
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, see for example Petzold (2014).
218 Commission Memo of 9 July 2014, MEMO/14/473 State aid:
Commission adopts revised guidelines for supporting firms in
difficulty – frequently asked questions, page 2.
219 Communication from the Commission of 31 July 2014 (2014/C
249/01)) Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-
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needs due to exceptional and unforeseen circumstances. By
way of reminder, the Commission has exclusive compe-
tence (subject to control by the EU Courts) to determine
whether or not certain aid merits derogation from the
general prohibition of Article 107(1),220 and consequently
whether or not an aid measure fulfils the conditions of the
2014 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
6.3.2 The compatibility with the internal market criteria
In addition to demonstrating that a firm is in financial
difficulty221 (or that there are exceptional and unforeseen
circumstances), the Member State wishing to grant the aid
will also have to comply with conditions that allow an aid
measure to be compatible with the internal market. These
conditions are listed as follows:
1. Contribution to an objective of common interest;
2. Need for State intervention;
3. Appropriateness of the aid measure;
4. Incentive effect;
5. Proportionality of the aid;
6. Avoidance of undue negative effects on competition
and trade between Member States;
7. Transparency of the aid.222
In order to show that a restructuring measure contributes
to an objective of common interest, a Member State will
have to, inter alia, submit a restructuring plan to restore the
beneficiary’s long-term viability.223 Even though a prima
facie this condition does not seem to differentiate so much
from the 2004 guidelines,224 it should be noted that now all
restructuring plans must be endorsed by the Commission in
all cases of ad hoc aid.225 In other words, where the 2004
Guidelines only stipulated endorsement by the Commission
for restructuring plans to ‘large enterprises’,226 the 2014
Guidelines require all restructuring plans to be endorsed,
irrespective of the size of the undertaking.
Points 60 to 69 of the 2014 Guidelines lay down the
conditions under which a rescue and/or restructuring
measure will be considered proportionate to the objectives
pursued. Unlike in the old Guidelines, where small
undertakings were expected to contribute at least 25% to
the restructuring plan, medium-sized undertakings 40%
and large undertakings 50%,227 the Commission now
considers an own contribution adequate if it amounts to at
least 50% of the restructuring costs for all beneficiaries.228
Consequently, the Commission has again harmonized the
criterion applicable to small, medium-sized and large
undertakings.
A new condition, the so-called burden sharing, aims at
making an aid measure proportionate to the objectives
pursued. The Commission believes that it is reasonable to
expect investors in a troubled company - particularly
shareholders, who receive the highest returns when the
company performs well – to bear a fair share of the cost of
restructuring.229 Therefore, State intervention should only
take place after losses have been fully accounted for and
attributed to the existing shareholders and subordinated
debt holders.230 In line with this, gains must also be shared
fairly. Therefore, an undertaking rescued and/or restruc-
tured through State aid must return a reasonable share of
the profits to the State, once it performs well.231
The Commission has replaced the term ‘compensatory
measures’ in the 2014 Guidelines with a series of measures
that must be taken to limit distortion of competition. These
measures include structural measures, behavioural mea-
sures and market opening measures.232 Even though the
terminology in the new Guidelines is different, the general
idea remains the same as in the old Guidelines: the mea-
sures should take place in particular in the market where
the beneficiary undertaking will have a significant position
after restructuring and have as objective to divest assets or
reduce capacity or market presence.233 The extent of such
measures will depend on factors, such as the size, nature,
circumstances and conditions of the aid; size of the
receiving undertaking; and the relative importance of the
beneficiary in the market and the characteristics of the
market concerned,234 thereby leaving considerable room
for the Commission to decide on the appropriateness of the
measures.
220 Supra, note 113.
221 The 2014 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
non-financial undertakings in difficulty, point 19.
222 Ibid, point 38.
223 Ibid, point 45.
224 See Sect. 4.1.2.
225 The 2014 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
non-financial undertakings in difficulty, point 46.
226 The 2004 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
firms in difficulty, point 34.
227 Ibid, points 43-44.
228 The 2014 Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
non-financial undertakings in difficulty, point 64.
229 Commission Memo of 9 July 2014, MEMO/14/473 State aid:
Commission adopts revised guidelines for supporting firms in
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Last but not least, with the objective of fulfilling the
‘transparency-criterion’, Member States are required to
publish the full text of each individual aid granting decision
and its implementing provisions on a comprehensive State
aid website, at national or regional level.235 This last
requirement is good news for academics, lawyers and other
stakeholders to scrutinize if and under what conditions
future rescue and/or restructuring aid is granted to profes-
sional football clubs, and if the Commission is consistent in
deciding the compatibility of those measures.
6.4 Bailing out your local football clubs: lessons
(not) learned
Barring the remaining uncertainties regarding adequate
compensatory measures (or measures to limit distortion of
competition under the 2014 Guidelines), the real problem is
the apparent lack of awareness of the State aid rules and
procedures in professional football clubs and local public
authorities. The fact that none of the rescue measures,
while clearly containing State aid elements, were notified
either shows that the concerned parties believed that they
were not ‘going to get caught’, or they simply were not
aware of the existence of the State aid rules and proce-
dures. Notification of a rescue operation does not auto-
matically mean that the measure will be declared
compatible,236 but it will increase the chances of a positive
outcome. During the preliminary investigation, triggered
by a notification, the Commission may engage in a dia-
logue with the Member State concerned, the recipient and
other interested parties, in an endeavour to remedy the
aspects of the measure which could be problematic under
State aid rules.237 Consequently, prior notification would
speed up the process, because formal investigations are
more likely to be avoided. It should be recalled that the
‘Dutch’ and ‘Spanish’ formal investigations took roughly
40 and 31 months, respectively, a period in which the
concerned clubs were faced with the uncertainty of whether
or not the aid had to be returned.
The next lesson to be learned from these cases is to
collaborate with the Commission, even after a formal
investigation has been launched. As has now become
apparent from press articles since the final decision was
announced, public authorities in Valencia have in the past
failed to respond to documentation requests made by the
Commission and simply left the matter ‘‘to rot in a
drawer’’.238 It is unclear whether this failure by the
Valencian authorities proved fundamental for the final
outcome of the decision, but it probably did not improve
the club’s chances of getting off the hook.
Interestingly enough, very little is known regarding
notifications of State aid granted to professional football
clubs in financial difficulty since the ‘Dutch’ and ‘Spanish’
decisions, even though Member States are required to make
authorized rescue operations publicly available.239 The
lack of known rescue aid measures, however, has probably
little to do with the lack of rescue operations. As was
mentioned in Sect. 1 of this article, the Enschede city
Council agreed on 16 February 2017 to guarantee a loan of
€8.4 million granted to the Dutch club FC Twente in order
to secure an earlier loan granted by the municipality to the
club of €17 million.240 A document published on the
municipality’s website further stipulates that ‘‘merely
maintaining the (…) loan of €17 million’’ equals a possi-
bility of bankruptcy of 100%.241 Given that FC Twente was
(and still is) clearly an undertaking in financial difficulty,
such a State guarantee must be notified to the Commission.
At this stage it is very much unclear whether the measure
was notified, or not.
Moreover, as recent media articles show, even Valencia
CF itself could well need State intervention in the (near)
future in order to survive as a football club.242 Should such
a situation materialize, and given that the Commission’s
approach for the assessment of State aid to professional
football clubs in financial difficulty is now out in the open,
public authorities and football clubs alike should use this
information to their own advantage. As long as the criteria
of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines are complied
with, starting with the obligation to notify, there should be
few reasons to fear negative Commission decisions.
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